no-arbitrary-file-access
Prevents file system access with unsanitized user input to protect against path traversal attacks.
⚠️ This rule errors by default in the recommended config.
Quick Summary
| Aspect | Details |
|---|---|
| CWE Reference | CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of Pathname) |
| OWASP | A01:2021 Broken Access Control |
| Severity | High |
| Category | Security |
Rule Details
Path traversal vulnerabilities allow attackers to access files outside the intended directory using sequences like ../. This rule detects fs.* calls where the path comes from user input.
The sink is the fs module however it is reached: fs.readFile, fs.promises.readFile,
a default, namespace or named import from fs/promises (import fsp from 'fs/promises',
import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises'), require('fs').promises, and fs imported
under another name.
Smart Detection: This rule recognizes safe patterns including:
path.basename()sanitizationpath.join()whose request-derived parts all pass throughpath.basename()— one basename argument does not clear the others:path.join(ROOT, req.query.folder, name)still escapesROOTwithfolder = '../../etc'startsWith()validation guards
Examples
❌ Incorrect
// A request-derived path
fs.readFileSync(req.query.file, 'utf8');
// `process.argv` is user input too
fs.readFileSync(process.argv[2], 'utf8');
// Destructured from the request — the same value as `req.query.file`
const { file } = req.query;
fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8');
// Assigned after the declaration
let target;
target = req.query.file;
await fsp.readFile(target);
// A safe-sounding parameter, filled with request input by a caller in this file
function readSafe(safePath) {
return fs.readFileSync(safePath);
}
readSafe(req.query.file);✅ Correct
fs.readFileSync('./config.json');Error Message Format
The rule provides LLM-optimized error messages (Compact 2-line format) with actionable security guidance:
🔒 CWE-22 OWASP:A01 CVSS:7.5 | Path Traversal detected | HIGH [SOC2,PCI-DSS,HIPAA,ISO27001]
Fix: Review and apply the recommended fix | https://owasp.org/Top10/A01_2021/Message Components
| Component | Purpose | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Risk Standards | Security benchmarks | CWE-22 OWASP:A01 CVSS:7.5 |
| Issue Description | Specific vulnerability | Path Traversal detected |
| Severity & Compliance | Impact assessment | HIGH [SOC2,PCI-DSS,HIPAA,ISO27001] |
| Fix Instruction | Actionable remediation | Follow the remediation steps below |
| Technical Truth | Official reference | OWASP Top 10 |
Known False Negatives
The following patterns are not detected due to static analysis limitations:
Indirect User Input
Why: Data flow through multiple variables not traced.
// ❌ NOT DETECTED - Indirect flow
const userPath = getPathFromRequest(req);
fs.readFileSync(userPath);Mitigation: Apply validation at the source.
Custom File Wrappers
Why: Wrapper functions around fs not analyzed.
// ❌ NOT DETECTED - Custom wrapper
function readUserFile(path) {
return fs.readFileSync(path); // Called with user input elsewhere
}Mitigation: Apply rule to wrapper implementations.
Paths This Rule Cannot Attribute To A Source
Why: This rule reports "file path from user input", so it stays silent when
there is no visible input to point at — a bare global, an unresolved import, a
parameter no call site in the file fills in. Reporting those said something
untrue and duplicated detect-non-literal-fs-filename at a second severity.
// ❌ NOT DETECTED - nothing here names a source
fs.readFile(userFile, cb);Mitigation: detect-non-literal-fs-filename
owns these; the two rules partition rather than overlap. process.argv is on
this rule's side of that split, which is the handoff that rule's own docs
describe. process.env is not reported: that delegation is conditional on
treating the environment as attacker-controlled, and an env var is normally
operator configuration — fs.readFileSync(process.env.CA_BUNDLE) is an operator
pointing a client at a certificate, not a traversal.
When Not To Use It
- In CLI tools where file paths come from command-line arguments, if you treat
process.argvas trusted (this rule does not — it reports those paths) - In build scripts processing known file trees
- When using a file access abstraction layer with built-in validation
Further Reading
Related Rules
- detect-non-literal-fs-filename
- no-unsafe-copy-from (planned) (in eslint-plugin-postgresql-security)
Category: Security
Type: Problem
Recommended: Yes
Use this rule
npm install -D oxlint-plugin-node-security{ "jsPlugins": ["oxlint-plugin-node-security"], "rules": { "node-security/no-arbitrary-file-access": "error" }}import { defineConfig } from 'vite-plus';export default defineConfig({ lint: { jsPlugins: ['oxlint-plugin-node-security'], rules: { 'node-security/no-arbitrary-file-access': 'error', }, },});oxlint-plugin-node-security re-exports eslint-plugin-node-security/oxlint: the same rules under the same IDs, and no ESLint install. Why oxlint.
Did this rule catch something? Star the repo to get new CWE coverage as we ship it — or follow the AI-code-security benchmarks behind these rules.